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other things, the Iranian deal. On May 7, the US and Ukraine entered into an agreement for "Cooperation in the Civilian Nuclear Field." US officials pointed out that Ukraine would lose hundreds of millions of dollars if it were to break its agreement to provide turbines to Iran, therefore, it should receive aid in the construction of the Rivne and Khmel'nitsky reactors. Kuchma explained that there were indeed many benefits in backing away from exporting its reactor turbines to Iran and expressed the hope that the EBRD would reconsider the rejection of Ukraine's application for funding during its annual meeting, which, by coincidence, was scheduled to convene in Kyiv on May 8-12.

In the run-up to the meeting, Kyiv was reported to be in a fever of "cleaning and scrubbing." Among its other accomplishments, the Kyiv government destroyed thousands of stray dogs. Over 7,000 people were attacked by stray dogs in Kyiv last year. Roughly 4,500 bankers attended the meeting, compared with 6,000 at previous meetings in Sofia and Saint Petersburg. Many bankers claimed that one reason for the decline in numbers at this year's meeting is that Kyiv does not have a five-star hotel. At the meeting, Belgian Finance Minister Philippe Maystadt argued for withdrawal from troubled countries like Ukraine and encouraged the bank to use its financing capabilities to prepare the Central European states for entering the European Union. Maystadt's arguments highlight a widely held view among European development bankers that the EBRD should be viewed primarily as an institution meant to ease the accession of former communist countries into the European Union; that it should, therefore, only engage with countries with a genuine prospect of entering the EU—that is, not with the countries of the former Soviet Union.

Yugoslavia

After winning the presidential elections in the fall of 1997, Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic (Democratic Party of Socialists [DPS]) has successfully built a Montenegrin-based coalition to stand against federal president Slobodan Milosevic (Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS]). On May 31, approximately 70 percent of the electorate turned out to affirm their support for President Djukanovic's coalition—"To Live Better"—which consists of DPS, the People's Party, and the Social Democratic Party. "To Live Better" won 49.5 percent of the vote, and federal prime minister Momir Bulatovic's Socialist People's Party (SPP) won 36.1 percent. Seventeen parties and coalitions vied for mandates in the 78-seat Montenegrin Parliament. Seats are won on a proportional basis in a single electoral district.

Milosevic and his faction now face the prospect of losing control of the *Savezna Skupstina* (the federal Parliament). Milosevic can count on a solid majority in the lower house; nevertheless, his hold on the upper house is no longer assured. According to Art. 80 of the federal Constitution, the upper house of the federal Parliament—the Chamber of Republics—is comprised of 40 deputies, 20 from Serbia and 20 from Montenegro. Under Art. 81 of the

Constitution, the election and termination of the federal deputies' mandates in the Chamber of Republics is "regulated by the law of each member republic." On June 3, DPS announced that the Montenegrin Parliament would elect DPS members to fill all 20 of Montenegro's seats in the Chamber of Republics. With half the seats in the upper house, Djukanovic would be able to block most federal legislation, including any bills which the Milosevic faction might propose for the purpose of establishing an occupation of Montenegro by federal police forces (federal constitutional Arts. 77 and 90). DPS federal deputies have yet to take their seats in the Chamber of Republics. Supporters of Milosevic and Bulatovic have filed a petition at the federal Constitutional Court asking the Court to rule that the Montenegrin delegation to the federal upper house must reflect proportionally the composition of the Montenegrin Parliament. If the Court rules in favor of the petitioners, Djukanovic would be forced to include Bulatovic supporters in the federal upper house and would thus lose his ability to block federal legislation.

Milosevic had anticipated the dangers of the Montenegrin parliamentary elections and spent the last few months attempting to head off a Djukanovic victory. On May 13, a no-confidence motion in federal prime minister Radoje Kotic had been initiated by SPP deputies. SPP claimed that Kotic was "not in a position adequately to organize and lead the federal government, especially regarding the accumulated economic, social, and political problems in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the newly arisen challenges on the international scene." Kotic had become federal prime minister after the fall of Milan Panic, in January 1993. He was reelected prime minister after federal parliamentary elections, in September 1996, but fell out of Milosevic's grace after attending Djukanovic's presidential inauguration, January 15. Rumors also circulated that Kotic opposed Milosevic's attempt to introduce a state of emergency in Montenegro after the presidential elections and was basically found to be not hostile enough to Djukanovic. According to Art. 104 of the federal Constitution, 20 deputies in either chamber of the federal Parliament may submit a written no-confidence proposal. For the no-confidence vote to be valid, the majority in each of the chambers must support it.

On May 15, the Montenegrin Parliament had tried to block the motion by amending the existing Law on the Election of Deputies to allow the Montenegrin Parliament to strip those deputies of their mandates who were failing to "represent Montenegro in line with its interests as defined under the Constitution and laws and with other regulations adopted by the republican Parliament." After amending the law, Parliament dismissed six Montenegrin members of the Chamber of the Republics. Those dismissed had been the DPS members who sided with Bulatovic after the party had split into two factions. Nonetheless, the federal Parliament's Mandate Commission reinstated the deputies' mandates and explained that the Constitutional Court must first decide if Parliament's dismissal of the deputies was legal before the removals would be effective.

On May 18, in the 138-seat Chamber of Deputies, 90 MPs voted in favor of the no-confidence motion against Konuc and 10 against. In the Chamber of Republics, 21 deputies backed the motion. According to Art. 97 of the federal Constitution, the federal president and the federal prime minister may not be from the same republic. As Milosevic is president, the prime minister must come from Montenegro. Immediately after the vote, Milosevic appointed Bulatovic as new federal prime minister. Bulatovic, strongly allied with Milosevic, is an enemy of Djukanovic and had lost the Montenegrin presidential elections to him last winter. (See Yugoslavia Update, *EECR*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Winter 1998.) As federal prime minister, Bulatovic retained much of the old cabinet and only dismissed three cabinet members who were Djukanovic supporters from Montenegro. The day after the vote, the Montenegrin Parliament adopted a resolution condemning the federal parliamentary decision that had allowed the six Montenegrin MPs to participate in the vote. In the resolution, the Montenegrin Parliament also stated that it did not recognize the legitimacy of the new federal government.

By provoking the fall of the existing federal government before the Montenegrin parliamentary elections, Milosevic has attempted to save Bulatovic in the face of his steadily dropping popularity ratings in Montenegro and to install a reliable ally in the more powerful office of federal prime minister. The federal prime minister appoints and dismisses members of the federal government (Art. 102), has jurisdiction over foreign-policy issues (Art. 99), and can call a vote of confidence in the government (Art. 103.3). With a majority of the Montenegrin electorate supporting Djukanovic's vision of a strong Montenegro and with Milosevic and his ally at the helm of the federal government, the intense political war between Serbia and the tiny Montenegrin Republic will continue and intensify.



The escalation of violence in Kosovo continued throughout the spring months. Observers estimate that between February and May, 209 Albanian civilians and 14 Serbian paramilitary policemen have died as a result of the fighting. While the Serbian police maintain that they are attacking only members of the paramilitary Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the Kosovo populace and shadow government claim that the police regularly fire at civilian villages. The KLA, said to include a core militia of 500 soldiers, controls several Kosovar villages and has distributed arms to thousands of Kosovar Albanians. The shadow government, led by President Ibrahim Rugova, is a de facto government which was formed in 1990 when the new Serbian Constitution effectively abolished the autonomy of Kosovo.

Under the threat of economic sanctions, Milosevic agreed to meet with Kosovar representatives but rejected the demand that an international mediator be present. Milosevic maintains that Kosovo is an internal Yugoslav affair. For their part, the Kosovars refused to meet with the Serbian side unless the meeting included a discussion of the region's independence.

On March 22, 1.1 million Kosovar Albanians voted for members of the 130-seat shadow Parliament and the president. The shadow government reported that Rugova's Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (DAK) won 67 of 130 parliamentary seats, while, in the presidential race, Rugova received 99.2 percent of the vote.

On March 23, special envoy of the Serbian government, Ratomir Vico, and senior adviser of the DAK, Fehmi Agani, signed the Agreement on the Normalization of Education in Kosovo. The agreement provides for the gradual return of Albanian students to schools and universities in Kosovo by June 30. Since Kosovo schools were ordered to conduct studies in the Serbian language in 1989, 20,000 ethnic Albanian university students and 60,000 high school students have pursued their studies in private homes with textbooks borrowed from Albania. Under the agreement, at education facilities in Kosovo, Albanian-language education will be held in the morning and Serbian-language courses in the afternoon. While the agreement does stipulate facilities for Albanian-language education, it did not deal with the more fundamental issues of curricula, financing, and school administration. The agreement was met by 30,000 protesting Serbian students and the president of the Serbian University, Radivoje Papovic, who renounced the agreement as a betrayal.

While Serb military units continued to shell Kosovo villages on the eve of the March 25 Contact Group meeting (which includes Russia, the US, England, France, Germany, and Italy), the group resisted imposing the US-proposed sanctions and gave Milosevic a four-week deadline to begin serious dialogue with Kosovar Albanians. On March 31, however, the UN Security Council initiated an arms embargo on Yugoslavia.

In another affront to the international community, Milosevic initiated a referendum to ask Serbians: "Do you want foreign representatives included in resolving the Kosovo question: yes or no." On April 6, Parliament amended the Law on Referenda and Citizen's Initiatives, shortening from 30 to 15 days the period required between the parliamentary vote to hold a referendum and when the referendum is held. On April 7, by a vote of 205 to 9, Parliament approved the government motion to hold the referendum and set the ballot date for April 23.

According to the official results, 73 percent of those eligible turned out to vote—94.73 percent answered "no," while 3.41 voted "yes." Election analysts pointed to numerous incidents of voter fraud. For example, in the Kosovo electoral circuit of Pec, where the referendum results more or less followed the national numbers, 139,039 citizens voted in nine electoral units. In that district ethnic Serbians number approximately 40,000. The official numbers have an implausibly large segment of 100,000 ethnic Albanians voting against international involvement in Kosovo.

Notwithstanding the agreement on education, violence continues in Kosovo. In early May, US envoys Richard Holbrooke and Robert Gelbard commuted between Belgrade and Pristina several times for meetings with Rugova and Milosevic. On May 9, foreign ministers

of the Contact Group announced a ban on future investment in Yugoslavia, a freeze of all production and export credits, as well as travel restrictions. On May 14, Holbrooke and Gelbard announced that the two sides had been convinced to drop their conditions and agreed to meet shortly in Belgrade and to hold weekly meetings in Pristina. Ultimately, Rugova backed down from the Albanian insistence on the presence of an international mediator. As a result, several of his aides resigned in protest. On May 15, Rugova and Milosevic met in Belgrade and issued a joint statement to the effect that there is "political will on both sides to resolve the Kosovo issue by political means." A week later, the two delegations met in Pristina. Proposed sanctions against Yugoslavia were dropped for the time being.

On February 19, Serbian President Milan Milutinovic appointed the incumbent prime minister Mirko Marjanovic to head the new Serbian government, but Marjanovic was unable to form a government throughout the spring. Many observers anticipated that Vuk Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement would join Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia-United Yugoslav Left (SPS-YUL) coalition in order to form a majority in Parliament. On March 24, SPS and YUL instead formed an alliance with Vojislav Seselj's Serbian Radical Party (SRP). Seselj is a nationalist who calls for the restoration of a greater Serbia and, as a paramilitary commander during the war, supervised ethnic-cleansing operations in Bosnia and Serbia.

Of Parliament's 250 seats, the SPS-YUL-SRP coalition holds 197 seats. SPS holds the premiership, 2 deputy

premierships, and 11 ministerial posts, including the Ministry of Interior. Seselj's SRP received 2 deputy premierships and 12 ministries, including the Information and Local Government ministries. Seselj was named deputy prime minister. YUL received one deputy premiership and five ministries, including those of justice and finance. Many surmise that Milosevic finally agreed to cohabitation with the ultranationalists in order to snub the West, and because he needed a reliable ally to support his campaign in Kosovo. Milosevic continued to try to silence any possible dissent at home.

On May 26, the Serbian Parliament passed a new Law on the University, prepared without any knowledge of university personnel, which effectively eliminates any form of academic autonomy. The law grants to the government the power to appoint and dismiss the president of the university, heads of departments, and university professors without the consent of faculties. Under previous legislation, the university faculty and administration operated more or less independently of the government. The government argued that because it finances the university it has "natural property and employment rights," similar to those of corporate directors, to employ or fire personnel. The law also changed the legal status of the university from a "public institution" to a "public enterprise," placing it under control of the government. The law also stipulates that all university positions will be "revised." Observers anticipate massive dismissals of professors and university staff who protested against Milosevic after the 1996 local elections. The law's passage was met by protesting students, and, on May 27, Dragan Kubrovic, Rector of Belgrade University, resigned in protest.

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