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laws of Ukraine, issues decrees and directives that are mandatory for execution on the territory of Ukraine.") The parliament contended that the constitutional provisions and laws of the state do not provide grounds for including the fund in the system of executive institutions, that is, under the control of the president or the cabinet. The Constitutional Court, however, ruled that, according to Art. 113 of the Constitution, the State Property Fund is an executive body and must, therefore, be subordinated to the cabinet. The provisions subordinating the fund to the Supreme Council were found unconstitutional and invalidated.



On May 27, the newly elected Crimean parliament nominated Sergei Kunitsyn as leader of the regional government, by a vote of 87 to 71. Kunitsyn, who is backed by the center-right prime minister, Valery Pustovoitenko, heads the Crimean branch of PDP and describes his nomination as the first attempt to create a coalition government in Crimea. The new government consists predominantly of representatives of CP, PDP, and the Union Party. The Communists and Pustovoitenko's PDP will have equal standing in the new Crimean government. According to the law, the parliament first had to vote to remove Anatoly Franchuk from the post before appointing Kunitsyn. Franchuk, a relation of President Kuchma, had previously served as a Crimean premier from October 1994 to December 1995.

Yugoslavia The tensions between Yugoslav federal president Slobodan Milosevic (the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS]) and Montenegrin president Milo Djukanovic (the Democratic Party of Socialists [DPS]) have calmed, while the violence in Kosovo, where the death toll has climbed to nearly 500, has escalated. According to statements made in July by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, approximately 90,000 people have been displaced as a result of the fighting—60,000 remain in Kosovo, 13,000 have fled to Albania, and 15,000 to Montenegro. Serbian paramilitary forces reportedly are engaging in tactics similar to those used in the war in Bosnia—the systematic destruction of villages inhabited by ethnic Albanians.

In its continuous attempts to resolve the violence, which threatens to spill over the borders and throughout the region, the international community has tried to quell the situation with diplomacy, threats, and ultimatums. On June 9, the EU and US froze all Yugoslav assets and slapped a ban on any investment funds flowing into the country, reiterating their demand that Milosevic allow foreign observers and humanitarian

workers into Kosovo and withdraw his troops. On June 12, in a NATO operation called "Determined Falcon," 85 jets performed air exercises in Albania and Macedonia, flying within 15 miles of the Yugoslav border. NATO secretary-general Javier Solana said that the exercises were a "final warning" to Milosevic and claimed that they "showed Belgrade their resolve in ending the violence in Kosovo." On June 15, Milosevic traveled to Moscow for a meeting with Russian president Boris Yeltsin. After the meeting, which Yeltsin claimed was "not easy," the two issued a declaration in which Milosevic agreed to cut back security forces in Kosovo in "accordance with the cessation of terrorist activities," to allow for the return of refugees, the freedom of movement for diplomats and humanitarian organizations, to negotiate with Kosovo, and ensure that Kosovo civilians would not be harmed by Serbian forces. Western commentators claimed that Milosevic had created a "loophole" and was still failing to comply with their most important demand—cessation of fighting. For their part, Kosovo representatives refused to meet with Yugoslav representatives as long as Serbian troops remained in Kosovo and the fighting continued.



On June 16, the Montenegrin parliament elected a new delegation to the upper house (the *Vece Republika*) of the federal Yugoslav parliament (*Savezna Skupstina*, or Federal Assembly), enabling it potentially to block federal legislation. The entire 20-member delegation consisted of members of Djukanovic's coalition, which won a majority of parliamentary seats in the recent elections. Moreover, according to the Law on the Election of Federal Deputies, newly passed in the Montenegrin parliament (*Skupstina Republike Crne Gore*), deputies in the federal upper house must vote according "to the interests of the republic, and not their party," meaning that they are legally required to vote according to decisions of the Montenegrin parliament and government. (See *Yugoslavia Update*, *EECR*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Spring 1998.) At one of its first sessions, true to its electoral promises, the DPS-dominated Montenegrin parliament adopted a resolution that demanded the return of all Montenegrin soldiers from Kosovo.

While both acts—the new electoral law and the resolution demanding the return of Montenegrin soldiers—seem to speak of a continued struggle between Djukanovic and Milosevic, many commentators now speculate that the two have reached an agreement. The rapprochement allegedly began when Djukanovic attended a meeting of the Supreme Defense Council of Yugoslavia, on June 9. At the meeting, council members—including Milosevic; the Serbian president, Milan Milutinovic; Djukanovic; the

federal prime minister, Momir Bulatovic; federal defense minister, Pavle Bulatovic; federal army chief of staff, Momcilo Perisic; and the secretary of the council—discussed the situation in Kosovo. Many speculate that, by including Djukanovic in the meeting, Milosevic was recognizing him as president of Montenegro, which he had previously refused to do. In the weeks following the meeting, rumors circulated around Belgrade and Podgorica of secret meetings between Milosevic and Djukanovic.

On July 20, Milosevic convened a meeting between himself, Milutinovic, and Djukanovic. After the meeting, the three issued the following declaration: "(1) Full support will be given to bringing the constitutions of Serbia and Montenegro [into congruence] with the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The strengthening of the FRY represents a vital state and national interest and affirms the equality of its citizens, peoples, and republics. (2) The problem in Kosovo-Metohija should be resolved by political means, starting from the principle of the equality of all the citizens and all national communities that live in Kosovo-Metohija. Any solution for Kosovo-Metohija and any discussion of the question of autonomy must respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the FRY and Serbia. Terrorism must be prevented by all means. The future of Kosovo-Metohija lies in peace, equality, and economic progress, not in national conflict, division, and isolation. All federal institutions, as well as the institutions of Serbia and Montenegro, will make an adequate contribution to the realization of these aims. (3) The strengthening of the information system [in other words, the media] will give a special impetus to the strengthening of the FRY. With this in mind, the relevant state institutions in the republics and on the federal level will prepare a program and personnel blueprint for Yugoslav Radio-Television."

(The Constitution of 1974 referred to Kosovo as the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. The new Serbian Constitution of 1990 refers to Kosovo by its pre-1974 name, Kosovo-Metohija. In general, Metohija is populated by Serbs, while Kosovo is populated by Albanians. This distinction, however, is not precise as many Serbs and Montenegrins have left Kosovo during the last ten years, and there are ethnic minorities, such as Turks and Roma, in both areas.)

Although speculations abound as to the political meaning of the meeting, most observers do not exclude the possibility that Milosevic capitulated to Djukanovic. International pressure on Milosevic has been intensifying to end the fighting in Kosovo and give the region some sort of autonomous status within the federal republic. According to rumors, there has been much talk behind the scenes of making Kosovo into a third

federal republic. In Montenegro, most people oppose this scheme. Many observers interpret the meeting as Djukanovic's pledge of support for making Kosovo a third federal unit, while Milosevic, in turn, recognizes Djukanovic and agrees to give him some sort of say in federal policy. Moreover, many surmise that the absence of Bulatovic—an opponent of Djukanovic's—from the meeting means that he will soon be ousted from his post as federal prime minister. The final statement regarding the media pertains to the recently established federal Yugoslav television station. Although established with federal funds, the station was widely used to discredit Djukanovic and support Bulatovic, during the recent Montenegrin parliamentary election. With this statement, Milosevic was apparently agreeing to end the station's propaganda war against Djukanovic.

On July 17, the Montenegrin parliament approved the new government headed by Filip Vujanovic (DPS). Vujanovic headed the interior ministry until being named interim prime minister in the government that ruled from this winter until the recent elections. The Socialist People's Party (SPP), which is headed by Momir Bulatovic, did not attend the session, while Liberal Alliance deputies voted against the government program. The government has five deputy prime ministers, three are from DPS, one from the People's Party (PP), and one from the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Of the fifteen ministries, Djukanovic's DPS holds six; Novak Kilibarda's PP, four; SDP, three; the Democratic Union of Albanians (DUA), one; and one is independent. One of the new government's first moves was the announcement of a voucher-based privatization plan slated to begin in September. According to the project, which has been valued at 2.5 billion German marks, each Montenegrin citizen will receive a voucher valued at 5,000 marks to buy company stocks and bonds.



Following the collapse of the previously mighty "Together" coalition last year, the Serbian opposition is disoriented and demoralized. At a roundtable organized by the independent daily *Nasa Borba*, on June 26, the opposition's poor electoral results were attributed to a variety of causes, including lack of confidence, lack of a common "pro" or positive political platform, egocentric leaders, corruption, and government "informers" placed among the opposition ranks. Nevertheless, several attempts at forming a wider opposition front have been undertaken in the recent past with varied results. A union between the Democratic Center (DC), headed by the dissident and opposition veteran, Professor Dragoljub Micunovic, and the newly formed Social Democracy Party (SDP) headed by Vuk Obradovic (a former Yugoslav People's Army general

and chief of staff of the former defense minister, Veljko Kadijevic), fell through when SDP announced that it could not accept a dual co-presidency. An SDP statement that they had checked the DC's bank accounts aroused suspicion about SDP's true "opposition" credentials, since bank accounts are presumably confidential. Milan Panic, the former Yugoslav federal prime minister from 1992 to 1993, now heads a movement called Alliance for Change (AC). The AC initiated a "Grand Convention of Democratic Reforms," along with organizing a roundtable discussion on "How to Achieve Democratic Reforms," in the city of Nis that was attended by most opposition leaders. Vuk Draskovic, however, did not participate. After the convention, some of the main opposition parties present at the gathering, including the Democratic Party (DP) led by Zoran Djindjic and the Civil Alliance led by Vesna Pesic, joined AC. The alliance stated that they are dedicated to the "establishment of a modern, democratic state, the revival of the economy, and an international comeback." In another attempt to unify the dismembered Serbian opposition, on July 16, a number of prominent—mostly nationalist—opposition leaders (including the former Yugoslav federal president, Dobrica Cosic, the Constitutional Court judge,

Slobodan Vuletic, and the former DP vice president, Miroslub Labus) formed the "Council for Social Transformation."

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Amid much protest, the new university law, which essentially eliminates any form of academic autonomy, took effect on June 5. According to the new law, universities will be governed by a management and supervisory board with government-appointed members. Members of the management board of the Belgrade University Law School are the deputy prime minister and extreme nationalist, Vojislav Seselj; SPS vice president, Goran Perjevic; and Minister of Justice Dragoslav Jankovic, who played an important role in the local election scandal in the fall of 1996. By July 5, the government had appointed all the new presidents and deans. The new president of Belgrade University is Professor Jagos Puric, a dedicated member of Mira Markovic's United Yugoslav Left. Article 165 of the law, which requires all employees sign new employment contracts by August 5, generated the most protest. Due to its retroactive nature, this provision was widely viewed as unconstitutional. Legally, all professors must now reapply for their university positions.

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